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THE DECLINE OF TENURE: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S
INTERPRETATION OF ACADEMIC TENURE’S SUBSTANTIVE
PROTECTIONS
John M. Badagliacca*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Academic tenure has played an instrumental role in shaping
higher education in America over the past century. In the most basic
sense, academic tenure provides job security to employees in the
1
academic field after a specified probationary period. William Van
Alstyne, an American law professor, provides a helpful definition in
his defense of tenure: “[t]enure, accurately and unequivocally
defined, lays no claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime
employment.
Rather, tenure provides only that no person
continuously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a
specified lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be
2
dismissed without adequate cause.”
Van Alstyne’s definition is
important because it emphasizes one of the crucial aspects of
3
academic tenure—employee dismissal only for “adequate cause.”
Tenure provides both substantive and procedural protections to
the tenured employee. The substantive protections prevent unlawful
dismissal—dismissal without adequate cause—while the procedural
protections ensure that employers follow a certain process during the
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1
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 403
(1993).
2
William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and “Defense,” 57 AAUP
BULL 328 (1971) (emphasis in original).
3
Throughout the history of academic tenure scholars, courts, lawyers, and
others have used the term “adequate cause” intermittently with “just cause” and
“good cause.” For this Comment, all three phrases mean the same thing: the cause
needed to properly dismiss a tenured professor.
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employment and dismissal of any tenured employees. Academic
tenure also includes the concept of “academic freedom,” or the
ability of professors to teach material in the way they see fit without
worrying about the pressures of censorship or overt administrative
restriction. This Comment analyzes the rights provided by academic
tenure and discusses the history and the reasoning for the adoption
of academic tenure in American colleges and universities.
Specifically, this Comment discusses whether tenure, as an
academic and legal concept, affords professors specific rights outside
of their employment contracts, or in the alternative, whether tenure
is an abstract concept that simply affords professors more freedom in
their pedagogical philosophies while providing no legal authority for
continuous employment outside of their employment contracts. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit chose the latter
in its interpretation of academic tenure in Branham v. Thomas M.
4
Cooley Law School. Lynn Branham was a tenured law professor at the
Thomas M. Cooley Law School who was terminated in December
5
2006. The court ruled that Branham’s tenure status did not afford
her any specific rights beyond those set forth in her employment
6
contract.
This Comment argues that the concept of academic tenure in
American higher education today implicitly affords tenured
professors procedural and substantive protections from termination.
These protections exist as tools to ensure that professors’ academic
freedom will remain uninhibited after a probationary period in which
the professors earn the right to its protections. In Branham, the Sixth
Circuit separated the job security aspect of academic tenure from the
academic freedom aspect, and treated tenure as a purely pedagogical
concept.
This interpretation reduces tenure to an almost
meaningless legal concept that affords no real employment
protections. The concepts of tenure as a grant of job security and
tenure as a grant of academic freedom are not mutually exclusive;
they are interdependently linked. One cannot exist without the
other. This interdependent concept of tenure allows the educational
system to progress, and to divide this concept is to endanger the very
system it was designed to protect. For these reasons the Sixth Circuit
erred in its interpretation of tenure.
This Comment serves as both a discussion of the legal
4
5
6

689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
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interpretation of tenure and a defense of tenure in American higher
education. Part II of this Comment sets forth the history of tenure in
American higher education. It examines the evolution of tenure, the
standards set forth by academic and legal organizations, and the
industry standards in American higher education. Part III discusses
the Branham case and its holding. Part IV addresses the nationwide
implications of the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of tenure and argues
that Branham’s tenure provided legal authority for her job security
regardless of the one-year duration of her most recent employment
contract. It also discusses the effect of the Branham ruling on
professors’ future job security and on their ability to exercise
academic freedom. Finally, Part V examines the contemporary
opinions on tenure in American higher education in relation to the
Branham ruling.
II. HISTORY OF TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
The history of specific legal protection for scholars can be traced
7
back to twelfth-century Europe.
In 1158, Emperor Frederick
8
Barbarossa issued the Authentica Habita, an edict that promised
scholars safe passage in their travels, protection from attack upon
9
their homes, and compensation for unlawful injury. This twelfthcentury edict shows how, even hundreds of years ago, western
civilization understood the need to afford certain protections to
those who pursued scholarly work and who would in turn pass on
their knowledge to the next generation. Special protection for
7

Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in FACULTY
TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 94 (1973) [hereinafter Metzger, Academic Tenure in
America].
8
Frederick I Barbarossa was a German-born Holy Roman Emperor who ruled
from 1152 to 1190, and is widely considered one of the most influential figures of his
time. MEDIEVAL GERMANY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (John M. Jeep ed., 2001).
Barbarossa’s reign represented a highpoint of German power, and his influence on
the German people remained long after his death:
[The Empire’s] territory had been wider under Charles, its strength perhaps greater
under Henry III; but it never appeared in such pervading vivid activity, never shone
with such lustre of chivalry, as under the prince whom his countrymen have taken to
be one of their national heroes, and who is still, as the mythic type of Teutonic
character, honoured by picture and statue, in song and in legend, through the
breadth of the German lands.
JAMES BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 72 (1864). Barbarossa’s edict undoubtedly
influenced later German concepts regarding special protections for scholars and
academics. See infra text accompanying notes 21–27.
9
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 94.
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educators, however, did not become a part of the American
educational system until relatively recently. Tenure did not reach
American schools until the latter half of the nineteenth century, and
the modern concept of academic tenure did not exist until the
10
beginning of the twentieth century. The concept of tenure took
time to develop in the United States, and did not emerge as a
fundamental doctrine of American education until the oldest
institutions of higher learning were forced to adapt to the progressive
11
academic movement at the turn of the twentieth century.
A. Origins of Tenure in the United States
In early nineteenth-century America, colleges anchored
themselves in tradition. By centering themselves in tradition,
American colleges were paternalistic, authoritarian, and extremely
12
skeptical of youth. Institutions of higher education focused on the
13
This
importance of Christianity, classical studies, and discipline.
14
pedagogical mindset left very little room for intellectual creativity.
At that time, professorial appointments usually lasted indefinitely and
15
continued as long as the professor exhibited good behavior.
Although these indefinite appointments existed, there was no legal
precedent to support the presumption that the professor should be
allowed to continue his employment absent adequate cause for
16
dismissal. As a result, the professor could be fired at will in many
17
institutions without any substantive or procedural protections. The
courts, not wanting to get involved in universities’ administrative
decisions, allowed university boards to govern themselves regarding

10

See generally WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE
UNIVERSITY (1955) (attributing tenure’s development in American schools to, among
others: the rise of Darwinism and German pedagogical influences in the second half
of the nineteenth century; the emergence of the university as a research institution
and the unprecedented support from big businesses in the late nineteenth century;
and the establishment of the AAUP in the beginning of the twentieth century).
11
Id. at 194 (“The establishment of the American Association of University
Professors in 1915 . . . was the beginning of an era in which the principles of
academic freedom were codified, and in which violations of academic freedom were
systematically investigated and penalized.”).
12
Id. at 4–5.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE 230
(1955).
16
Id.
17
Id.
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18

faculty hiring and firing decisions. All appointments were, in a legal
19
The norms and
sense, temporary and instantly extinguishable.
standards regarding professorial employment also varied from school
to school, and the standards of any given university depended largely
20
on its location and the people in charge.
While academic tenure as a legal concept was unclear and
undefined in America during the nineteenth century, that period
marked the beginning of a cultural infusion that would reshape
American thoughts on academic freedom. In the nineteenth century
21
over nine thousand Americans studied in German universities.
These returning students, along with German scholars teaching in
the United States at the time, assimilated German methods and ideals
22
into American higher education. One of the most important ideals
that Germans brought to the United States was the concept of
lehrfreiheit, which roughly translates to “teaching freedom,” and
23
encompasses what we now call “academic freedom.”
Particularly, the concept of lehrfreiheit meant two things: (1) that
a university professor was free to perform his own research and to
report his findings through publication or lecture; and (2) that the
professor enjoyed the “freedom of teaching and freedom of
24
inquiry.” The Germans did not believe that adherence to lehrfreiheit
was a voluntary choice for universities: “[t]his freedom was not, as the
Germans conceived it . . . a superadded attraction of certain
universities and not of others; rather, it was the distinctive prerogative
of the academic profession, and the essential condition of all
25
universities.”
Lehrfreiheit also promoted the concept of limited
26
administrative rules within the education system. Therefore, the
German idea of academic freedom entailed the right of professors to
teach without fear of dismissal, and promoted an atmosphere of

18

Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 133.
James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Employment
Relationship Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159, 164 (2000).
20
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 135.
21
METZGER, supra note 10, at 93.
22
Id. The German concept of giving professors and scholars specific protections
traces all the way back to Emperor Barbarossa’s Authentica Habita. See supra notes 8–9
and accompanying texts.
23
Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide Between Legal Academia
and Legal Practice, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 318, 329–30 (2008).
24
METZGER, supra note 10, at 112–13.
25
Id. at 113.
26
Id.
19
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27

administrative leniency surrounding the teaching process.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the professoriate
began organizing into specialized departments reflecting national
28
specialist organizations.
This created a more specialized faculty
comprised of research scholars who could best be evaluated by their
29
disciplinary peers rather than by administrators or lay trustees. After
this shift, universities were only a short step away from adopting the
belief that faculty should be involved in a quasi-judicial proceeding to
30
determine whether another faculty member should be dismissed.
This new specialized faculty brought with it a conflict between
31
professors and administrators. The more the professors explored
and critiqued their own specialized field—delving into controversial
32
topics and ideas—the angrier the administrators became.
The
divergence of traditional views in academia had previously been easy
grounds for dismissal, but the turn-of-the-century technological
advances and the philosophical shifts of the era resulted in a different
33
outlook toward progressive academic thought. It became apparent
that to continue the progression of the era, institutions of higher
34
learning needed to promote greater academic freedom. While the
technological advances of the industrial revolution created a demand
for highly trained scientists, universities sought out professors with
special skill-sets to provide their students with the education needed
35
to keep with the progressive time period.
In turn, these highly
skilled professors demanded a great level of academic autonomy in
36
order to advance the sciences. University leaders began publicly
embracing the protection of progressive academic thought at the
37
beginning of the twentieth century. In the 1907 commencement
address, Harvard president Charles W. Eliot said:
27

Id.
Fishman, supra note 19, at 164. These organizations were tailored to specific
disciplines. Id. For example, history professors became part of the newly formed
American Historical Association. Id. The American professor now belonged to a
broad professional group (the faculty) and a narrower professional group within a
specific discipline. Id.
29
Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330.
30
Fishman, supra note 19, at 165.
31
Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 331.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See, e.g., METZGER, supra note 10, at 124.
28
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[S]o long as . . . boards of trustees of colleges and
universities claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the
officers of the institutions in their charge, there will be no
security for the teachers’ proper freedom . . . . [I]t is easy
for a department to become despotic, particularly if there
38
be one dominant personage in it.
Eliot’s statement was one of the first to link academic freedom
with the goal of avoiding administrative interference with faculty
39
positions.
At the time of Eliot’s commencement address, the
American university was uprooting itself from its authoritarian past,
40
allowing an opportunity for the modern tenure system to take hold.
B. The AAUP
In 1900, Stanford University dismissed economics professor
Edward A. Ross from his position due to his political and social
41
views. Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, an associate professor at Stanford,
42
resigned in protest of Ross’s dismissal. In 1913 Lovejoy, along with
eighteen professors from Johns Hopkins University, wrote a letter to
colleagues at other leading universities asking them to join in the
43
formation of a national association of professors. The purpose of
the association was to protect the institutional interests of faculty,
specifically through the creation of general principles regarding
44
tenure and the legitimate dismissal of faculty.
Professors around the country responded favorably to the
Hopkins Letter, resulting in the establishment of the American
45
Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915. The AAUP
modeled itself after the American Bar Association in order to
38

Id.
Dickinson, supra note 23, at 331.
40
This tenure movement gained momentum in the early twentieth century, but
still took time to develop: in 1913 a Wesleyan professor was dismissed for giving a
speech in which he urged less rigid observance of the Sabbath. See Metzger, Academic
Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 146.
41
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 138. Jane Lathrop
Stanford, the widow of Stanford University’s founder Leland Stanford, used her
power as the sole trustee of the university to pressure the university into dismissing
Ross. Id. Although Ross’s dismissal was a monumental event in the movement for
the protection of academic freedom in America, Ross was no progressive role model.
Stanford pushed for Ross’s removal after Ross publicly shared his hatred of nonwhites, specifically Chinese immigrants. Id.
42
Id. at 137.
43
Id. at 135–37.
44
Fishman, supra note 19, at 166.
45
METZGER, supra note 10, at 194.
39
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promote its desire to serve as a link between professionalism and
46
academic freedom. In the same year of its establishment, the AAUP
issued the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and
47
Academic Tenure.
The report championed three elements of
academic freedom: “freedom of inquiry and research, freedom of
teaching within the university or college, and freedom of extramural
48
utterance and action.” In 1940, the AAUP, in coordination with the
Association of American Colleges (AAC), released a new statement of
49
principles —the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure (“1940 Statement”) received widespread endorsement and
50
became one of the most influential of all such formularies.
The 1940 Statement defined tenure as a means to two specific
ends: “(1) freedom of teaching and research and of extramural
activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security to make
51
the profession attractive to men and women of ability.” With the
new goals of tenure set forth, the AAUP then labeled freedom and
economic security as “indispensable to the success of an institution in
52
fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.” The 1940
Statement further demanded that, after a probationary period,
53
After
teachers should have permanent or continuous tenure.
achieving tenure, the professor could not be terminated except for
54
adequate cause. One of the shortcomings of the 1940 Statement was
its failure to clearly define adequate cause, providing only “an
oblique reference to moral turpitude and a suggestion as to how
55
incompetence should be judged.” The 1940 Statement also sets forth
an early framework for the procedural rights afforded to tenured
professors: “[t]ermination for cause of a continuous appointment, or
46

Fishman, supra note 19, at 167.
See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1
AAUP BULL. 291 (1915), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres
/A6520A9D-0A9A-47B3-B550-C006B5B224E7/0/
1915Declaration.pdf [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
48
Id. at 292.
49
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152; 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY TENTH 3 (2d ed.), available
at http://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/principles-academic-freedom-tenure.pdf
[hereinafter 1940 Statement of Principles].
50
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152.
51
1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 3.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 4.
54
Id.
55
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 153 n.91.
47

BADAGLIACCABADAGLICACA PROOF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

COMMENT

5/12/2014 1:49 PM

913

the dismissal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a
term appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a
56
faculty committee and the governing board of the institution.”
In 1958, the AAUP and AAC collaborated again to release a
more detailed and stringent policy on the procedural standards for
57
dismissals. This new policy stated that when the first reasons arise to
question the fitness of a tenured faculty member, the administrative
officer should first seek a personal conference with the faculty
58
member. The faculty member may then request a hearing in order
to determine whether he should be removed from the faculty
59
position on the grounds stated. The faculty member had the right
to counsel, to question all witnesses who testify orally, and to be
60
confronted by all adverse witnesses. In addition, there must be a
61
record of all of the evidence against the professor.
Since 1957, the AAUP has continuously released and revised a
policy document titled Recommended Institutional Regulations on
62
Academic Freedom and Tenure (“Recommended Regulations”).
The
document reflects the development of AAUP standards and
63
The
procedures, and the most recent revision is from 2009.
opening lines of the Recommended Regulations state its purpose to
“protect academic freedom and tenure and to ensure academic due
64
process.”
The Recommended Regulations specifically point out that
dismissals of all forms of faculty members will not be a means of
curbing academic freedom: “[a]dequate cause for a dismissal will be
related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in
their professional capacities as teachers or researchers. Dismissal will
not be used to restrain faculty members in their exercise of academic
65
freedom or other rights of American citizens.” The language of the
56

1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4.
1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, in AAUP
POLICY TENTH 12 (2d ed.), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/standards-facultydismissal.pdf.
58
Id. at 13.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 14.
62
AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
AND
TENURE
(2009),
available
at
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/E45D7D3B-00F1-4BC0-9D0A-322DF63A1D07/
0/RIR.pdf.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1.
65
Id. at 4.
57
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Recommended Regulations shows a conscious effort on the part of the
AAUP to defend the idea that tenured professors can maintain job
security without fear of arbitrary dismissal. Almost one hundred years
after its inception, the AAUP still champions the protection of
academic freedom in American institutions, and reinforces that idea
66
in its published works.
C. The American Bar Association
Law schools are a particularly prominent subset of American
institutions of higher learning. Like some other graduate schools,
law schools have the special quality of being linked to both the
educational world and to the world of a specific and prominent
profession. Therefore, as members of educational institutions, law
professors fall under the protection of the standards and regulations
67
of the AAUP.
But law professors, as members of the legal
profession, may also find guidance and protection under the
68
standards and regulations of the American Bar Association (ABA).
Every year, the ABA releases its Standards and Rules of Procedure for
69
Approval of Law Schools (“ABA Standards”). The main purpose of the
publication is to set forth the requirements law schools must meet in
70
order to obtain and retain ABA approval.
ABA accreditation is
important because in most states, one must have attended an ABA
71
accredited school in order to sit for the bar exam. Attending an
ABA accredited school also ensures that the student will receive a
72
nationally approved program of legal education.
The ABA Standards also set forth the standards and requirements
73
that govern law school faculty at ABA accredited institutions.
Standard 405, labeled Professional Environment, states that “[a] law
66

See generally AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013).
67
Id.
68
See ABA, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS
vii
(2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_educatio
n/Standards/2012_2013_aba_standards_and_rules.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS].
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
For more information on the ABA’s accreditation and approval of law schools
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
http://www.americanbar.org
see
FREQUENTLY
/groups/legal_education/resources/frequently_asked_questions.html.
72
See id.
73
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 29.
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school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to
academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix 1 herein is an
74
example but is not obligatory.” Standard 405 also includes a set of
75
interpretations to explain the standard. The explanation of tenure
in interpretation 405-6 bears a heavy resemblance to the concept of
tenure maintained by the AAUP: “[a]fter tenure is granted, the
faculty member may be terminated only for good cause, including
termination or material modification of the entire clinical
76
program.” Interpretation 405-6 also grants specific protections to
77
professors with long-term contract agreements.
The trend and
popularity of long-term contracts for faculty members will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV infra.
As mentioned above, the ABA Standards provide an example of a
tenure policy for accredited law schools to adopt—since the schools
must establish an academic tenure policy. The example given by the
ABA, labeled Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, is the exact
78
text from the 1940 Statement issued by the AAUP.
The ABA’s
decision to adopt the AAUP’s policies on academic freedom and
tenure as the template for law schools shows that the ABA accepts the
79
AAUP’s regulations in matters regarding academic tenure.
Although the ABA Standards state that law schools do not have to
adopt the exact example given, the ABA’s choice to use the 1940
Statement as its tenure policy template is clearly an endorsement of
80
the AAUP’s tenure policies.
D. Current Tenure Statistics
The National Center for Education Statistics reported that in the
fall of 2010, 46% of full-time professionals employed at postsecondary schools (including law schools and other professional
81
schools, but excluding medical schools) had faculty status.
The

74

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
76
Compare id. at 33, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4.
77
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 33.
78
Compare id. at 161, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 3.
79
The ABA’s Statement on Academic Freedom begins with a notation that the text of
the statement follows the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles. ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 68, at 161.
80
Id.
81
LAURA G. KNAPP ET. AL., NAT’L CENT. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, EMPLOYEES IN
POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2010, AND SALARIES OF FULL-TIME INSTRUCTIONAL
STAFF, 2010–11, at 3 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012276.pdf.
75
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report further states that 21% of all full-time professionals had
82
tenure, meaning 45.6% of employees with faculty status had tenure.
Another 17.4% of faculty employees were on a tenure track, while
only 15.2% of full-time faculty belonged to post-secondary schools
83
without a tenure system. This data shows that a vast majority of
colleges and universities across the country utilize some form of
tenure system. In those schools, over half of the full time faculty
members have tenure status or are on a tenure track. Tenure is a
major part of American education, and any change to the substantive
tenure doctrine will have serious implications for the institutions and
84
professors participating in some form of tenure system.
Thus,
academic tenure’s ability to ensure academic freedom must be
protected or else true academic freedom in American institutions of
higher learning may begin to disappear.
III. THE BRANHAM DECISION
In August 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether a professor’s tenure status afforded her
any specific rights outside of her current employment contract in
85
Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School. The court ultimately held
that Branham’s tenure status did not grant her any rights other than
those enumerated in her individual employment contract for the
86
most recent year.
The ruling set a precedent against the legal
significance of tenure status and bolstered the importance of
employment contracts for graduate professors.
Thomas M. Cooley Law School hired Lynn Branham as a
87
criminal law professor in 1983. On December 21, 2005, Branham
signed an employment contract for a twelve-month employment
88
Branham’s employment
period beginning on January 1, 2006.
contract contained a section labeled “Rank and Title” which read:
“The Professor shall hold the rank and title of TENURED
PROFESSOR OF LAW with all the rights and privileges thereof, as
defined in the Bylaws of the School or as may from time to time be
82

Id.
Id.
84
See generally id. (showing the large number of institutions and professors
countrywide that participated in tenure programs as of fall 2010).
85
689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit subsequently denied a
rehearing and a rehearing en banc. Id.
86
Id. at 563.
87
Id. at 561.
88
Id.
83
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conferred by the Board of Directors.”
In the section labeled
“General Provisions,” the employment contract expressly
incorporated some of the ABA’s standards: “The current provisions
of the American Bar Association standards governing approval of law
schools as they relate to maximum teaching loads and other rights,
duties, and prerogatives of faculty members shall be and become part
90
of this contract by reference thereto.”
Branham’s employment
contract also expressly incorporated Cooley’s Policy 201—the law
91
school’s policy regarding academic rank and tenure.
In the Spring Semester 2006, Branham taught Constitutional
92
Law and Torts.
Branham completed the semester without a
problem although she expressed displeasure with the school
administration for not assigning her any criminal law-related
93
courses. In the Fall Semester 2006 she was again assigned to teach
94
Constitutional Law, which she refused to teach.
Instead, she
95
requested an assignment to teach a course related to criminal law.
In December 2006, after Branham refused to teach her assigned
96
course, Cooley dismissed Branham from her position. Branham’s
employment contract required Cooley to put Branham’s dismissal to
97
a faculty vote before the dismissal could be final. Cooley failed to
follow this procedure, and there was no faculty vote concerning
98
Branham’s dismissal.
Upon her dismissal, Branham filed a complaint for wrongful
99
dismissal for breach of contract against Cooley in federal court. The
District Court for the Western District of Michigan concluded that
Cooley had breached the employment contract by not following the
100
dismissal process required by the contract. The court then ordered

89

Employment Contract at 12, Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No.
1:07-CV-630, 2010 WL 3505930 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2009).
90
Id. at 15.
91
Branham, 689 F.3d at 562; see infra text accompanying note 102.
92
Id. at 561.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Branham, 689 F.3d at 561.
98
Id.
99
Id. Branham got her breach of contract claim into federal court under
supplemental jurisdiction arising out of a concurrent ADA claim that Branham
brought against Cooley. Id.
100
Id.
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Cooley to comply with that process. Cooley’s Policy 201 states:
No tenured faculty member shall be dismissed . . . prior to the
expiration of the term of his appointment, except for good cause
shown and in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) Notice in writing by the dean of the reasons and
grounds for dismissal shall be served on the faculty member
at least fourteen days prior to a meeting of the faculty
conference at which the removal is to be considered, as
provided in subparagraph (b) herein.
(b) The Dean shall thereafter cause a meeting of the faculty
conference to be convened for the purpose of considering
removal of the faculty member.
(c)If the faculty conference shall concur in removal, the
faculty member shall be removed, subject to appeal to the
102
academic committee of the Board of Directors.
In accordance with the court’s decision, Cooley held a faculty
conference to debate whether adequate cause existed to dismiss
103
Branham. The faculty concurred with Cooley’s decision to dismiss
Branham, and the district court then ruled that Cooley had complied
with the procedural requirements set forth in Branham’s
104
employment contract.
Although the district court found that
Cooley had originally violated the procedural requirements
regarding Branham’s dismissal, the court went on to rule that the
tenure granted under Branham’s contract did not afford her rights
105
beyond those specified in her employment contract.
Branham
appealed the district court’s decision, bringing the issue to the Sixth
Circuit.

101

Id.
Id. at 563.
103
Branham, 689 F.3d at 561.
104
Id. After the district court ordered Cooley to conduct the faculty conference,
the school issued Branham a written notification of the reasons for her dismissal. Id.
at 563. The faculty members at the conference voted 85–19 in favor of Branham’s
dismissal. Id. The district court ruled that Cooley’s actions satisfied the procedural
requirements for dismissal even though the faculty conference took place years after
Branham’s original dismissal. Id.
105
Id. at 562.
102
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A. The Sixth Circuit’s Analysis in Branham
On appeal, Branham argued that her status as a tenured
professor granted her a lifetime appointment or a guarantee of
106
continuous employment.
She believed that the court should have
incorporated the ABA’s suggested tenure policies into her
employment contract and used those policies to interpret the rights
107
and protections she had regarding her employment status.
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the issue by examining
Michigan contract law and finding that “contracts for permanent
employment are for an indefinite period of time and are
108
presumptively construed to provide employment at will.”
109
Branham’s contract was a twelve-month employment contract.
Therefore, under Michigan contract law, Branham’s contract was not
a contract for permanent employment unless a specific provision of
the contract granted her employment for an indefinite period of time
110
outside of the twelve-month agreement. Importantly, the court did
not find that Branham’s tenure status, which was expressly
111
incorporated into the contract, granted her indefinite employment.
The first step the Sixth Circuit took in its analysis was to define
the exact rights Branham’s tenure status provided her as a professor
112
at Cooley. Due to the employment contract’s express incorporation
of the ABA’s standards governing approval of law schools, the court
looked to ABA Standard 405 in order to interpret the scope of
113
Branham’s tenure rights.
Standard 405 states that “[a] law school
shall have an established and announced policy with respect to
114
academic freedom and tenure . . . .”
The ABA provides a model
tenure standard, which, as mentioned in Part II supra, is the same
standard as the model standard adopted by the AAUP’s 1940
115
Statement.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the 1940 Statement but
concluded that since the ABA articulated that the statement “is an
example but is not obligatory,” the tenure standard set forth by the
106

Id.
Id.
108
Id. at 562 (quoting Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 271
(Mich. 1991)).
109
Employment Contract, supra note 89, at 12.
110
Branham, 689 F.3d at 562.
111
Id. at 563.
112
Id. at 562.
113
Id.
114
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 32.
115
See id. at 33.
107
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116

statement was not necessarily the tenure that Branham held.
The
court then took its analysis a step further and concluded that even if
the tenure rights outlined in the 1940 Statement were the exact rights
incorporated into Branham’s contract, the tenure held by Branham
still did not afford her any special rights beyond those enumerated in
117
her contract.
The court reached its conclusion due to a narrow reading of the
1940 Statement. The 1940 Statement reads “teachers . . . should have
permanent or continuous tenure,” prompting the court to find that it
was merely a suggestion, and not a requirement, that law schools
118
grant permanent or continuous tenure.
Therefore, absent any
provision in the contract expressly defining Branham’s tenure as
permanent or continuous employment, the court found that the
language of the contract did not grant any form of permanent
employment, and that Branham only had a contract for a twelve119
month period of employment.
The Sixth Circuit posited that the
tenure to which Branham’s contract referred might have meant that
she had academic freedom, and that Cooley generally expected to
enter into new employment contracts with her each year, but that
Branham was not guaranteed continuous employment through her
120
tenure status or her employment contract.
After the court
completed its analysis of Branham’s substantive tenure rights it
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the court-ordered faculty
conference complied with the procedural rights afforded to Branham
121
under her employment contract.
B. The Correct Analysis of Professors’ Tenure Rights
The Sixth Circuit erred by ruling that Branham’s tenure did not
afford her rights beyond those specified in her most recent
employment contract. First, the court erroneously concluded that
only contracts for an indefinite period of time could establish
122
permanent employment.
The court supported its reasoning by
citing Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., which held that contracts for

116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Branham, at 562.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 56263.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Branham, 689 F.3d at 562.
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permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time. Thus,
since Branham’s contract was not for an indefinite period of time,
124
Branham did not enjoy any right to permanent employment.
The problem with the court’s reliance on Rowe is that Rowe does
125
not address the concept of tenure.
The plaintiff in Rowe was a
126
saleswoman, not a graduate professor with tenure status. The Rowe
court did not need to address the issue of any additional employment
127
rights such as tenure. Therefore, while the decision that contracts
for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time
remains good law, it fails to fully cover the issue of Branham’s
substantive tenure rights. The concept of tenure that scholars have
promoted throughout history is that the tenured professor does not
need to rely on contracts in order to maintain permanent
128
employment.
Tenure is the grant of a permanent employment
status. If the only way to ensure a prolonged promise of employment
is to enter into an employment contract for a permanent or lengthy
129
period, then the entire purpose of academic tenure becomes moot.
Multiple courts have found that a professor’s tenure status grants
him employment rights on top of his current employment contract,
and that the rights expressly outlined in employment contracts do
130
not automatically limit or restrict substantive tenure rights.
For
example, in Collins v. Parsons College, the Supreme Court of Iowa
ruled that a professor who was granted tenure in a one-year
employment contract could be terminated only for just cause and on
123

473 N.W.2d. 268 (Mich. 1991).
Branham, 689 F.3d at 562.
125
See Rowe, 473 N.W.2d 268 at 272 (deciding whether an employer’s oral
statements and written policy statements created an indefinite employment
contract).
126
Id. at 270.
127
See id. at 272.
128
Permanent employment may better be described as indefinite employment
with job security. The permanent employment that tenured professors maintain is
an employment that continues unless there is adequate cause for dismissal or the
professor decides to leave. Permanent employment granted by tenure status is not a
permanent contract for employment to which both the school and the professor are
bound. It is a contractual option; the school is bound to employ the tenured
professor year to year (as long as the professor decides to sign the contract), while
the professor has the option of leaving at his own will at the end of every year.
129
See generally Ralph S. Brown Jr. & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and
Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325 (1990); Metzger, Academic Tenure in
America, supra note 7; Van Alstyne, supra note 2.
130
See, e.g., Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 (Mont.
1981); Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d. 594 (Iowa 1973); State ex rel. Richardson
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953).
124
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written charges before the faculty.
Collins had signed a one-year
contract, which labeled him as a tenured professor even though the
132
Upon expiration of the
contract did not expressly define tenure.
contract term, the college informed Collins that he would not be
133
employed the following year.
The college did not allege any
adequate cause for its dismissal of Collins or make any suggestion
134
that Collins’s dismissal was due to his performance.
The court
ruled that Collins “did not waive his right of tenure by executing
written contracts carrying out the original agreement in individual
135
years.”
Therefore, although Collins entered into an employment
contract for a period of only one year, he was still entitled to
136
Additionally, the
indefinite employment due to his tenure status.
Collins court was willing to look to the general plain meaning of
tenure in order to define what Collins’s tenure status entitled him,
but did not need to resort to that analysis because the school’s tenure
137
policies were clearly outlined in its bylaws.
The Supreme Court of Nevada encountered a similar tenure
issue in State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents of University of
138
Nevada.
There, the court found that the university’s bylaws
regarding tenure were binding even if they were not enumerated in
139
the professor’s individual employment contract. Frank Richardson
had been an associate professor at the University of Nevada for four
140
years when he was dismissed because of alleged insubordination.
The university’s tenure policy was outlined in a faculty bulletin
promulgated by the Board of Regents, which stated that upon an
associate professor’s completion of one year of service he could be reappointed, after which re-appointment “his employment shall continue
141
under tenure.”
The bulletin went on to state that a tenured
131

Collins, 203 N.W.2d. at 598.
Id. at 596.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 597.
135
Id. at 598.
136
Id. at 599.
137
Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 59798. The court looked at the definition of tenure in
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: “a status granted usu. after a
probationary period to one holding a position esp. as a teacher and protecting him
from dismissal except for serious misconduct or incompetence determined by formal
hearings or trial; permanent tenure.” Id. at 597.
138
261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 515.
141
Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
132

BADAGLIACCABADAGLICACA PROOF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

5/12/2014 1:49 PM

923

COMMENT
142

professor may only be dismissed for cause.
The court makes no
mention as to whether the university expressly incorporated the
tenure policy or Richardson’s tenure status in any of the employment
143
contracts Richardson signed with the university.
Regardless, when
the Board of Regents was challenged on its jurisdiction regarding
Richardson’s dismissal, the Board argued that its tenure policy was
144
not binding and could be ignored whenever the Board saw fit.
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that the policy was binding,
and stated that the rule, “having been duly established, has the force
and effect of statute,” and that it affected all “persons holding their
145
positions under contract.”
The University of Nevada had a clear
statement of its tenure policies, which its Board of Regents
146
endorsed.
Therefore, regardless of the rights set forth in its
employees’ contracts, the university had a binding obligation to obey
its tenure policy, which provided continuous employment to tenured
147
professors.
The rights tenure status enshrines for professors is not limited to
termination cases. The Supreme Court of Montana ruled on a
tenure issue that did not involve termination in Keiser v. State Board of
148
Regents of Higher Education. Marjorie Keiser was the Director of the
149
School of Home Economics at Montana State University. In 1975,
Keiser signed a full academic term (twelve-month) employment
150
contract, which stated that she had “continuous” tenure status.
Then, in 1978, the president of the University only offered Keiser a
151
All of
partial academic term (ten-month) employment contract.
Keiser’s employment contracts had termination clauses stating that
the school could only terminate a faculty member with continuous
152
tenure if there was “adequate cause.” But “continuous tenure” was
142

Id.
Id. at 515.
144
Richardson, 261 P.2d at 517.
145
Id. at 518.
146
Id. at 516.
147
Id. at 518.
148
630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981).
149
Id. at 195.
150
Id. at 196.
151
Id. After the 1975 contract, Keiser signed a new contract year after year with
the identical twelve-month academic term until 1978 when the university refused to
offer her a full term contract. Id.
152
Id. at 198. The contract also allowed for termination if the university found
itself in financial exigency. Id. This Comment does not discuss financial exigency
terminations of tenured professors, but certain terminations of tenured professors
143
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not defined in any of Keiser’s contracts.
The court looked to the 1940 Statement issued by the AAUP in
order to define tenure and determined that the goals of tenure were
academic freedom and economic security, or the promise of
154
indefinite employment.
Since economic security was a goal of
tenure, the court ruled that Keiser and Montana State University had
that goal in mind when executing Keiser’s 1975 employment
contract, and it ruled that a main ingredient of Keiser’s continuous
155
tenure was appointment of a full academic term.
Therefore, the
court found that the reduction in Keiser’s academic term was a
156
Keiser’s right to continuous
violation of her continuous tenure.
full-term employment was not expressly enumerated in any of her
employment contracts, but the court in Keiser looked outside the
contracts to define the scope of Keiser’s tenure rights and ultimately
ruled that her tenure status—undefined in all of her contracts—
157
afforded her a specific set of protections.
C. The Correct Interpretation of Branham’s Tenure Rights
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Branham stands in direct
contradiction with the ruling in Collins. Like Collins, Branham was a
tenured professor, which was expressly stated in her employment
158
Branham also signed a contract that covered a one-year
contract.
159
The Sixth Circuit should have followed the
term of employment.
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Iowa in Collins—ruling that while
the employment contract only covered a one-year term, the
professor’s tenure status afforded him continuous employment
160
unless adequate cause existed for dismissal.
The main difference between Collins and Branham is that in
Branham the law school most likely had adequate cause to dismiss
161
Branham—her refusal to teach her assigned classes.
But the fact
that Cooley had adequate cause to dismiss Branham does not
mitigate the error in the court’s analysis. The court ruled that
are valid under the financial exigency doctrine.
153
Id.
154
Keiser, 630 P.2d at 199.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2012).
159
Id.
160
Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d 594, 597–99 (Iowa 1973).
161
Branham, 689 F.3d at 561.
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Branham’s tenure status was meaningless beyond the agreements set
forth in her employment contract, meaning that, even if Cooley
lacked adequate cause, it had the ability to dismiss Branham free of
legal consequence at the expiration of her one-year employment
162
contract.
That is the exact situation that academic tenure is
supposed to prevent.
In Richardson, the university most likely had adequate cause to
dismiss the professor because of insubordination, but the university
tried to skirt its own tenure policies, and the court ruled that the
163
policies were binding regardless of the professor’s contract.
In
Keiser, the professor’s tenure status prevented the university from
reducing her academic term at the expiration of her employment
164
contract. The scope of the protection that tenure affords professors
is the core issue at stake in Branham, not the outcome of the
professor’s employment. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reached the
165
correct outcome: Branham’s dismissal was proper.
But the court
used a flawed rationale in order to reach that outcome, and the
ruling that emerged as a result of the court’s flawed reasoning struck
a harsh blow to the doctrine of academic tenure.
The Branham case is a prime example of a situation where
administrative inefficiency forced the court to enter into an analysis
that resulted in an errant legal ruling. Branham’s employment
166
contract granted her tenure status but did not define tenure. The
contract then incorporated the ABA Standards, which provides that “a
law school shall have an established and announced policy with
167
respect to academic freedom and tenure.”
At that point, the
contract still did not give any definition or explanation as to what
168
The courts in Collins and
Cooley’s tenure status actually meant.
162

Id. at 563.
State ex rel. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515, 518
(Nev. 1953). Similar to the facts in Branham, the university in Richardson had
adequate cause to dismiss the professor, and the school rightfully dismissed the
professor.
Id. at 515 (explaining that Richardson was uncooperative and
insubordinate). But the Richardson court made sure that the correct procedures were
taken during the dismissal in order to ensure that the university’s tenure rights
protected professors in future situations where the university may not have adequate
cause for dismissal. Id. at 518.
164
Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194, 199 (Mont.
1981).
165
Branham, 689 F.3d at 566.
166
Id. at 562.
167
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 32.
168
See Employment Contract, supra note 89, at 15.
163
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Richardson did not have to face this issue. In Collins, the court noted
that it was unnecessary to delve into a discussion on the meaning of
tenure because the faculty bylaws at Parsons College specifically
stated that a tenured faculty member “could be terminated only for
170
just cause, on written charges before the tenured faculty.”
In
Richardson, the court went as far as to rule that the university’s tenure
policy had the force of a statute because there was a faculty bulletin,
which expressly stated that upon reappointment after one year, an
171
associate professor’s employment “shall continue under tenure.”
The tenure policies of both institutions clearly provided that tenured
professors have the right to continuous employment because of their
172
tenure status. Collins and Richardson are examples of administrative
efficiency.
The Michigan Court of Appeals illustrated the best example of
how administrative efficiency can help solve problems by defining
173
tenure in Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology.
In that case, the
school dismissed a professor without adequate cause, prompting the
professor to argue that his dismissal was improper due to his tenure
174
status.
The court stated, “the answer to this question depends
entirely upon the construction given to the language of . . .
175
defendant’s tenure policy.” After looking to the school’s policy, the
court found that the professor had achieved tenure status, and then
176
The school’s tenure
sought to determine what that status meant.
policy defined tenure as “expectation of continuous appointment
until retirement, with stipulations that it may be terminated for
causes specifically identified in the present statement of tenure
177
policy.” Here, the court looked to the school’s policies, found the
178
The
policy on tenure, and made a ruling based on that policy.
Sixth Circuit was unable to perform an easy and straightforward
analysis like the one in Bruno because Cooley’s tenure policy was not

169

See generally Branham, 689 F.3d 558; Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d 594
(Iowa 1973).
170
Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 597–98.
171
State ex rel. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515, 516
(Nev. 1953).
172
See Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 597–98; Richardson, 261 P.2d at 516.
173
512 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
174
Id. at 747.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 749.
178
Id. at 747–49.
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179

clearly defined.
The administrative inefficiency found in the Branham case—
specifically, the lack of a clear definition of tenure in Branham’s
employment contract or Cooley’s school policies—forced the Sixth
Circuit to devise its own interpretation of the scope of Branham’s
tenure rights. Since Branham’s contract expressly incorporated the
standards of the ABA, the court looked at the ABA’s model set of
180
tenure policies—a direct copy of the AAUP’s 1940 Statement.
The
1940 Statement defines tenure as a means for economic security and
states that professors “should have permanent or continuous tenure,
181
and their service should be terminated only for adequate cause.”
Despite the 1940 Statement, the court rejected the argument that
Cooley adopted the ABA’s model tenure policy because it found that
the policy was merely an example for schools and not an obligation
182
that they must follow.
The court then admitted that Cooley’s Policy 201 referred to the
183
concept of tenure, but did not define it.
The lack of a clear
definition of tenure in the employment contract or in Cooley’s
policies forced the court to analyze multiple tenure policies set forth
by different organizations, and the court failed to choose the correct
standard that applied to Branham. Instead, the Sixth Circuit decided
that the ABA/AAUP policy did not apply—reasoning that the policy
was merely a model of a tenure policy, and did not necessarily
184
represent the tenure Branham held. Thus, no right to continuous
employment existed because there was no right to continuous
185
employment in the employment contract. The Sixth Circuit further
erred by claiming that, even if it incorporated the 1940 Statement into
the employment contract, Branham would still not have been
afforded any rights other than those explicitly laid out in her
186
The court reached this conclusion by claiming that the
contract.
statement suggests but does not require that law schools grant
187
permanent or continuous tenure. In Collins, Richardson, and Keiser,
179

See Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. 689 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2012).
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 161; see also 1940 Statement of Principles, supra
note 49.
181
1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4.
182
Branham, 689 N.W.2d at 562.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 562–63.
186
Id. at 562.
187
Id.
180
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the courts treated “tenure” and “continuous tenure” as synonymous
188
Tenure is continuous; there is no such thing as nonterms.
continuous tenure. Therefore, the problem with the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning is that Cooley had already granted Branham tenure. Thus,
by granting her “tenure,” Cooley granted Branham “continuous
tenure,” and the issue as to whether the school was obligated to grant
continuous tenure or not disappears.
In order for the Sixth Circuit to correctly interpret the scope of
the protections afforded to Branham by her tenure status, the court
needed to accept the definition of tenure in the 1940 Statement. No
other clear definition of tenure existed in the employment contract
189
or in Cooley’s bylaws.
Thereafter, the court would have read the
1940 Statement as a policy that granted any tenured professor
permanent or continuous employment because the 1940 Statement
defined tenure as a means for economic security and outlined the
190
substantive and procedural rights of tenured professors.
The court should have held that, while the employment contract
was a method for the school to set up a contract for payment to the
professor, the professor’s tenure ultimately controlled her
employment status. In a contractual sense, tenure is a type of
option—where the school is bound to employ the tenured professor
if she decides to come back year after year unless there is adequate
cause for termination, but where the professor is free to leave after
any year without any binding obligation to the school. As long as the
professor has achieved tenure status, defined in the school’s bylaws,
the designated length of the professor’s most recent employment
contract should not govern the length of time that the school
remains obligated to employ the professor. In this case, Branham’s
tenure status did afford her certain rights and protections not
specified in her most recent employment contract, such as the right
191
to continuous employment.

188

See Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981);
Collins v. Parsons Coll., 203 N.W.2d. 594 (Iowa 1973); State ex rel. Richardson v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953).
189
Branham, 689 F.3d at 562.
190
1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49.
191
As mentioned supra, Cooley most likely had adequate cause to dismiss
Branham, but the court’s ruling will allow schools to dismiss tenured professors
without cause at the expiration of their employment contracts. See text accompanying
note 161.
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRANHAM DECISION
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Branham will have adverse effects on
the American professoriate and American education. The first
problem for American professors is the interpretation of academic
tenure. By ruling that a professor’s tenure status does not afford that
professor any rights or protections other than those specified in the
professor’s individual employment contract, the Sixth Circuit
192
diminished the role of academic tenure.
As much as American
higher education has changed in the past one hundred years, the
main goal of tenure has remained the same: to protect academic
freedom.
This goal is still important and necessary.
Any
diminishment in the substantive rights afforded to professors with
tenure status will result in a diminishment of the protection of
academic freedom in American institutions of higher learning.
Branham allows colleges and universities discretion to grant
professors “tenure” without also granting them the rights and
193
protections that traditionally accompany tenure.
Following the
Branham decision, institutions will be able to appease professors by
granting them “tenure” while circumventing the protections that
should accompany the professors’ tenure status by: (1) not defining
any specific tenure rights in professors’ employment contracts and
(2) having a vague tenure policy that allows for a broad
interpretation of whether tenure actually means continuous
employment or not. Cooley managed to achieve just this in Branham.
If this ruling stands, the protections of academic tenure will wane, as
employment security for professors will only exist in their current
employment contracts. Essentially, “tenure” will become a hollow
title, rendering it a meaningless badge of seniority.
The diminishment of academic freedom that will result from the
destruction of the traditional academic tenure doctrine will have the
most adverse effect on American education because professors will no
longer have the continuous job security that allows them to introduce
innovative thought into the classroom without fear of dismissal. An
educational system that makes it difficult to penalize a speaker
194
reinforces the speaker’s academic freedom. Meanwhile, a restraint
195
on academic freedom leads to a restraint on progressive thought.
192

Branham, 689 F.3d at 563.
Id.
194
Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 329.
195
See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 330. Van Alstyne argues that one of the main
functions of tenure is “to maximize the freedom of the professional scholar and
193
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Tenure as job security and tenure as academic freedom are linked
such that the latter cannot truly exist without the former. Tenure
provides extra job security to professors because it provides a means
196
to academic freedom. The concept of lehrfreiheit will no longer exist
in American education if school administrations are not required to
adhere to certain tenure standards and can control all employment
protection through the professor’s employment contract. Professors
might revert to the antiquated, anti-progressive teaching styles for
fear of losing their jobs if they promote too much non-traditional
197
thinking.
The suppression of creative thought that spurred the
creation of the AAUP will increase as the protections afforded by
198
academic tenure decrease.
The ruling in Branham will also incentivize professors to seek
more contractual protections instead of the previously guaranteed
protections of tenure. This will mean that seasoned professors will
constantly have their next contract agreement in mind when
planning on what materials to teach and how to teach them,
especially if schools choose to hire them using one-year contracts.
Instead of teaching and researching in a comfortable and protected
environment, professors will be pressured to prove their short-term
worth. Tenure is a long-term commitment that promotes long-term
intellectual growth.
The temporal restraints that come with
employment contracts will impede that intellectual growth.
One potential solution to the problem in Branham is for
institutions to clearly define their tenure policies in both their bylaws
and employment contracts. The bylaws should expressly state that
199
the school has a tenure system (as required by the ABA), and then
elaborate on what substantive and procedural protections tenure
200
status gives tenured professors.
Professors’ employment contracts
should also state that the professor is a tenured professor and
teacher to benefit society through the innovation and dissemination of perspectives
and discoveries aided by investigations, without fear that he must accommodate his
honest perspectives to the conventional wisdom.” Id.
196
Id.
197
See METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10,
at 4–5.
198
See id. at 194.
199
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68, at 32.
200
See, e.g., 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 49, at 4 (“After the expiration of
a probationary period, teachers or investigators should have permanent or
continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for adequate cause,
except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances
because of financial exigencies.”).
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expressly incorporate the tenure policies of the school (which should
be clear and unambiguous) in order to eliminate any confusion as to
what tenure means or the rights of the tenured professor. Cooley’s
unclear polices and employment contracts allowed the Sixth Circuit
201
to enter into an errant analysis on tenure.
The result of that
analysis now threatens to alter and restrict American tenure doctrine.
Cooley’s administrators have already recognized the law school’s
victory as a gateway to impose more restrictions on tenured faculty
202
members. In a statement released after the Sixth Circuit’s decision,
James Robb, Cooley’s Associate Dean for Development and Alumni
Relations, stated that “[t]he Sixth Circuit’s decision is very important
to institutions of higher learning because it confirms that ‘tenure’ is a
contractual concept which takes its meaning only from the language
of the particular employment contract and from nothing else. The
203
word ‘tenure’ itself adds no gloss . . . .” But nowhere in the AAUP
regulations, the ABA regulations, or the in the historical evolution of
tenure in the United States has tenure been treated as primarily a
204
contractual concept. It has been treated as exactly the opposite—a
concept that lies outside the restrictions of normal employment
205
standards and security. The judiciary needs to protect this concept
of tenure in order to ensure that academic freedom continues to
206
thrive in American colleges and universities. Conversely, the Sixth
Circuit’s ruling weakens the economic security provided by academic
tenure and, in turn, endangers academic freedom.
V. CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS ON ACADEMIC TENURE
The use of the tenure-track system in American colleges and
universities has its critics and its supporters. The anti-tenure
community fears that tenure provides too much job security to
professors and allows professors to slip into a pattern of mediocrity
207
without fear of dismissal.
The pro-tenure base shares the views of
201

Branham, 689 F.3d 558.
See U.S. Court of Appeals Finds in Favor of Cooley Law School, THOMAS M. COOLEY
LAW
SCH.
(Aug.
6
2012),
http://www.cooley.edu/news/2012
/us_court_of_appeals_finds_in_favor_of_cooley_law_school.html.
203
Id.
204
See PART II supra.
205
Id.
206
See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 330.
207
For articles that highlight or explain the negative effects of tenure systems in
higher education see Fishman, supra note 19; Dickinson, supra note 23, at 341–43;
Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 331–33.
202
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this Comment—that academic tenure protects academic freedom,
208
which promotes progressive and creative thought in the classroom.
In recent years, the anti-tenure camp has gained some traction, and
the Branham decision will undoubtedly add to that momentum.
The ABA has also started showing some signs of moving away
from its tenure policy. In 2010 a special committee of the ABA
209
proposed a revision to its guidelines on academic freedom. In the
revision, the committee proposed to remove Standard 405, which
210
requires all schools to establish a tenure policy.
The committee
characterized the change in the standards as a way to minimize
“intrusive mandates” on schools seeking accreditation, and urged that
211
schools should still protect academic freedom.
Many law school
212
professors around the country vehemently oppose this proposal.
The professors specifically oppose the proposal because it came only
a few weeks after multiple groups issued lengthy statements in favor
213
of preserving the existing protections.
As of the 2012–2013 ABA
214
Standards, there has been no change to the ABA’s tenure policy.
Apart from the ABA, a growing belief exists among American
colleges and universities that that the education system would be
215
better without tenure. Many institutions are moving towards hiring
faculty members with long-term contracts instead of implementing a
216
tenure-track system. In a survey by The Chronicle of Higher Education,
less than a quarter of college presidents preferred full-time tenured
217
professors to faculty working under long-term or annual contracts.
208

See generally Brown & Kurland, supra note 129; Van Alstyne, supra note 2.
Scott Jaschik, Law School Professors’ Tenure in Danger?, USA TODAY (July 26,
2010, 4:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-07-26-ihe-lawtenure_N.htm.
210
Id. (stating that some members of the special committee did not believe that
Standard 405 ever imposed a tenure requirement); but see ABA STANDARDS, supra note
68, at 32 (“A law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect
to academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix 1 herein is an example but is
not obligatory.”). Thus, while the ABA’s tenure policy example is not obligatory, a
plain reading of the text shows that each accredited law school must have some
established tenure policy.
211
Jaschik, supra note 209.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 68.
215
Jack Stripling, Most Presidents Prefer No Tenure for Majority of Faculty, CHRONICLE
OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 15, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Most-PresidentsFavor-No/127526/.
216
Id.
217
Id.
209
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Proponents of long-term contracts for professors argue that tenure’s
protections make it too difficult to get rid of incompetent faculty and
218
can promote a culture of complacency among tenured professors.
One critic of tenure even posited that academic tenure has led to a
219
dearth of practical legal training in law schools.
Although there has been a movement to remove tenure from
higher education, there are still many defenders of the traditional
concept of tenure. Law Professor William Van Alstyne believes that
tenure’s function as a protection for academic freedom provides
220
more benefit than harm. Van Alstyne states, “[a]n individual who is
subject to termination without showing of professional
irresponsibility, irrespective of the long term of his service within his
discipline, will to that extent hesitate publicly to expose his own
perspectives and take from all of us that which we might more
221
usefully confront and consider.”
Therefore, at the risk of giving
tenure to professors who may become complacent, an institution may
force its professors to withhold progressive thought in the
222
classroom.
The occasional “deadwood” scholar, who becomes
complacent but does not function so poorly as to warrant removal
223
may exist, but this is the exception not the rule. Surveys show that
tenured professors publish more, teach more, and serve on more
224
committees than untenured professors.
Tenured professors also
tend to do a large amount of research in their field, allowing them to
educate their students on the latest academic works and
225
breakthroughs.
Additionally, when institutions enforce their
tenure policies properly, they will dismiss poor professors when
226
adequate cause exists.
Contrary to what many tenure opponents believe, tenure is
essential to prevent decline in quality amongst the professoriate.
Tenure promotes efficiency by diminishing uncertainty regarding job

218

Id.
See Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide Between Legal Academia
and Legal Practice, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 329 (2008).
220
See Van Alstyne, supra note 2.
221
Id. at 330.
222
Id.
223
Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 332.
224
The
Truth
About
Higher
Education,
NAT’L
EDUC.
ASS’N,
http://www.nea.org/home/33067.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
225
Id.
226
See King v. Univ. of Minn., 774 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1985) (dismissing professor
for charges of incompetent performance).
219
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227

security.
Tenure also promotes what Henry Rosovsky labeled the
228
“social contract” of tenure. The “social contract” of tenure includes
the assurance that one can work without interference, that one
belongs to a select company of educated men and women, and that
229
one can grow old without the fear of being pushed out of one’s job.
230
This concept creates a favorable climate for academic freedom.
231
Tenure also creates a business pattern called “hands-tying.”
A
university ties its hands so that it cannot renege just because the
appointment of a particular faculty member was not as fruitful as the
232
administration expected.
This promotes better selection methods
233
and hiring efficiency by institutions of higher learning. In the long
run, institutions should benefit from this method because smart, able
scholars will join those institutions due to the opportunity to teach at
234
a high level with good job security.
Tenure provides its own
protection from poor professors because as difficult as it is to remove
a tenured professor, it is just as difficult to become a tenured
professor. Nationally about 2% of tenured faculty members are
235
dismissed each year.
Meanwhile, the average probationary period
236
for a professor at a four-year school is seven years.
This is long
period of evaluation, during which schools may choose not to renew
the professor’s appointment or to dismiss the professor without
237
cause.
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Branham promotes the movement
toward long-term contract agreements for professors in place of
tenure status.
It offers legal support for the power of the
employment contract over the power of the generally accepted
concept of academic tenure. The problem with long-term contracts
is that the protections professors would normally have under tenure
will only exist during the term of the contract and will disappear at
the end of the term. This is exactly how the probationary period for
227

See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 331.
Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 333 (citing HENRY ROSOVKSY, THE
UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 183 (1990)).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 334.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Brown & Kurland, supra note 129, at 334.
235
The Truth About Higher Education, supra note 224.
236
Id.
237
Id.
228
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tenure works now.
The only difference is that probationary
professors receive short-term contracts instead of long-term
238
At the end of a contract the professor loses the
contracts.
substantive and procedural rights that would have been afforded to
him for life if he was a tenured professor. Tenure’s critics may
perceive the Branham ruling as a victory for American colleges and
universities, and a loss for the professoriate, but this is a loss for both
sides because the positive aspects of academic tenure far outweigh
the negative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The founders of academic tenure in American higher education
created tenure in order to ensure academic freedom. They felt the
oppression of an antiquated, authoritarian educational tradition that
stifled progressive thought, and instilled fear in those who chanced to
speak out against it. The first step to protect academic freedom was
to offer job security to the professoriate. The first step to the
destruction of academic freedom will be to eliminate that job
security. The Branham court erred in its ruling because it ruled that
Branham’s tenure did not afford her rights beyond those specified in
her most recent employment contract. That ruling resulted in a
huge blow to the job security that tenure status afforded tenured
professors.
According to the Sixth Circuit, the substantive
protections of tenure no longer exist unless they are specifically
enumerated in each professor’s current employment contract. The
proper interpretation should have been that once Branham accepted
her position as a tenured professor, she was entitled to continuous
employment notwithstanding her annual employment contracts.
Cooley may have been justified in dismissing Branham for adequate
cause, but that does not change the validity of her tenure status
regarding the specific rights enumerated in her most recent
employment contract. This interpretation is important because it
protects professors’ tenure status and protects the vital rights that
tenured professors receive: continuous employment and academic
freedom.
If left unchanged, the Branham decision will lead to the
deterioration of tenure and the deterioration of academic freedom.
The Sixth Circuit’s weakening of academic tenure rights will result in
the dissipation of tenure track systems in American institutions due to
238

A contract of five years or more can be considered a long-term contract.
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the inability of tenure to serve its main purpose to the professors.
Professors will seek long-term contracts in order to ensure job
stability, and true academic freedom—the ability to teach without
fear of dismissal for teaching style or innovative classroom material—
will no longer exist. This is a step in the wrong direction for
American higher education. The Branham decision is the gateway to
the erosion of academic freedom, and the preservation of the
academic integrity of the professoriate requires that the legislature or
the judiciary fix the problem Branham created.

